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     Recently the question of how the formation of regional trade agreements (RTAs 
hereafter) affects the location of industry has been studied by a group of economic 
geography theorists including Baldwin and Venables (1995) and Puga and Venables 
(1997). They argued that when some countries form an RTA, production is expected to 
shift into the RTA. They called it “production shifting-in effect” of the RTA. 
     One way to prove their findings is to investigate an increase in the inflows of foreign 
direct investments into the regional free trade areas from the rest of the world. For 
instance, see Figure 1 for time series of FDI inflows of the original 15 member countries 
(signed in as of 1958) in the EC from 1976 to 1998. It is clearly demonstrated that the EC 
has attracted a large amount of foreign direct investments from abroad. So, the data 
seems to support their theoretical finding. However, ironically it is also true that there has 
been an increase in FDI outflows from EC to the rest of the world for the same range of 
years. See Figure 2. So, the empirical evidences of the production shifting-in effect of 
RTA seem ambiguous. 
     This paper tries to fill the gap between their theoretical findings and the data, by re-
investigating the theories of economic geography and regional integration. In particular, 
this paper shows that the industrial structure resulting from the production shifting-in 
effect of an RTA, to be stable, may need non-higher external trade costs between the 
RTA and its non-RTA countries. 
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     In order to explain spatial differences of production structure in an economic 
geography model, it is essential to include elements such as increasing returns to scale, 
positive trade costs and imperfect competition. Krugman (1991) and Krugman and 
Venables (1995) had such common features in their models and showed how they created 
core-periphery structures through externalities among economic agents. One of the main 
differences between the two papers is their assumption on factor mobility. In Krugman 
(1991), where workers are mobile, an industrial firm needs a unit of worker to produce an 
output, so when the firm moves to a  place, it increases a labor demand in that place, 
which increases the wage rate. The higher wage will attract workers to move to that 
place. However, in Krugman and Venables (1995), where workers are not mobile 
between countries, a firm is not only a final good supplier to consumers but also an 
intermediate goods’ demander and supplier. When a firm moves to a place, it increases 
the intermediate goods’ demand in that place, which increases its price. The higher price 
of the intermediate good will attract another intermediate firm to move to that place.  
     Puga and Venablaes (1997) extended Krugman and Venables (1995) to a model of 
multiple nations. They did several comparative static analyses for exogenous trade 
barriers among countries and its impact on  firms’ profitability. The two main results are 
as follows. First, in a symmetric case with positive trade costs, when the internal trade 
barriers begin to drop between two RTA countries, the firm outside the RTA starts to 
move inside because of the higher profits created by lower trade-cost advantages. They 
acknowledged a similar finding by Baldwin and Venables (1995).  Second, what is novel 
in their paper is that, when the internal trade barriers continue to drop to zero, even within  
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the regional integration, there occurs a local industrial concentration in one RTA 
member. Puga and Venables’ results are insensitive to a later change in the level of 
external trade barriers. As a final producer, a firm inside an RTA would always have a 
cost advantage as long  as the internal trade costs are smaller than the external trade costs 
as a result of a formation of a regional trade agreement. However, the present paper 
claims that such insensitivity may need to be reconsidered. 
     To see this, I extend Krugman’s (1991) economic geography framework to 
incorporate multiple nations. Unlike the model developed by Krugman and Venables 
(1995), the Krugman (1991)’s model assumes, first, that workers are mobile between 
countries and peasants are immobile, and second, that both workers and peasants are all 
consumers in the economy, and third, that firms are final good’s producers.  
     First, I replicate the “production shifting-in” effect of an RTA in the extended 
Krugman’s model. That is, given a positive and symmetric level of all trade costs among 
countries, a preferential removal of internal trade costs between RTA members makes 
production shift into the RTA region. This result confirms the production shifting-in 
effect that has been argued in the economic geography model. 
    Next, in order to check the stability of the industrial structure resulting from the 
production shifting-in effect to a later increase in the external trade costs, at first I 
consider a stable asymmetric equilibrium in which (1) all workers and manufacturing 
firms are concentrated in one of the RTA countries and (2) the exogenously given 
internal trade costs between the RTA countries are zero and (3) the exogenously given 
external trade costs between the RTA and its non-RTA are positive. Note that this is very  
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similar to the industrial structure resulting from the production shifting-in effect in Puga 
and Venables (1997). I show that, all other things being equal, this equilibrium becomes 
unstable if the exogenously given external trade costs become higher than the level in (3). 
The intuition for this result is as follows. In order to attract a worker to move to a non-
RTA country, the defecting firm has to compensate the worker with a higher wage. The 
higher wage will increase the firm’s profit maximizing price in the non-RTA country. 
Then the firm’s revenues will increase relatively more than the increases in its cost 
embodied by the higher wage since not only the worker but also the peasants who are 
living in the country have to pay the higher price. 
      
     The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In section 2, I will extend a simple model 
suggested by Krugman (1991) to include multiple nations, and characterize the short run 
and long run equilibrium. In section 3, I show the effect of the formation of an RTA on 
global economic geography-production shifting-in effect. In section 4, I show that, the 
industrial structure resulting from the production shifting-in effect may become unstable 
if there is a later increase in the external trade costs. Section 5 concludes.  
 
2 The Model of Economic Geography with Multiple Countries 
 
2.1 The Basic Model (an Extention of Krugman (1991)) 
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     Consider a trading system with M countries. In each country, there are two production 
sectors; a commodity sector and an industrial sector. The commodity sector is perfectly 
competitive. It produces products under constant returns to scale, using one unit of labor 
per unit of output. The goods are homogenous and costlessly tradeable
1. They serve as 
numeraires. The industrial sector has imperfectly competitive firms producing 
differentiated goods under increasing returns to scale. The goods are traded with iceberg 
cost
2,  i j, t . This implies that  t  units have to be shipped from country j so that one unit 
arrives in country i.  
     Following Dixit and Stiglitz (1977), production of a quantity  ) (h xi  of any variety h in 
any country  i requires the same fixed ( a) and variable ( ) (h xi b ) quantities of the 
production input. The cost function of a firm producing variety  h in country  i is 
)) ( ( ) ( h x w h c i i i b a+ = , where  i w  is a wage rate of workers in industrial sector in country 
i. 
                                                  
1 As Dixit and Stiglitz (1980) mentioned, this good can be thought of as the time at the disposal of the 
consumers. Researchers such as Fujita, Krugman, and Venables (1996), Yossi Hadar (1996) took into 
account positive trade costs for the homogeneous goods as well as differentiated goods, and then they 
studied an incentive for workers migration from the rest of the world that may keep regional agglomeration 
within a country. However, Davis (1998) argued that (1) when transportation costs are identical for both 
types of goods, the home market effect vanishes, and (2) unless the relative costs of trading differentiated 
goods are unusually high, every country will produce them in exact proportion to its size. But Davis 
(1998)’s framework differs in that the migration is ruled out in his ‘open’ economies between two 
countries. In our paper, we do not rule out a possibility of migration between members of RTA and non-
RTA members.  
 
2 Under the assumption of an iceberg transport cost, the CES utility and monopolistic competition implies 
that spatial price discrimination is equivalent to mill pricing which is only one kind of other alternatives 
such as uniform delivered pricing. Such consideration would be important when one is serious about a 
firm’s various pricing policies in a region. See Ottaviano and Thisse (1998) for more details. 
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     There are two factors of production in each country; peasants and workers. Following 
Krugman (1981), each factor is assumed specific to one sector. Peasants produce 
commodities, and workers produce  industrial goods. The peasant population is assumed 
to be completely immobile between countries with a given peasant supply  M / ) 1 ( m -  in 
each country. Workers may move between countries. Let  i L  be the worker supply in 
country  i. A total number of workers is assumed to be  m = ￿ =
M
i i L
1 . In Krugman and 
Venables (1995) and Puga and Venables (1997), workers are assumed not to be mobile 
internationally but nationally. In the latter paper, workers are not mobile even within a 
regionally integrated market. 
     The representative consumer in each country has Cobb-Douglas preferences  over 
commodity and a CES aggregate of the industrial goods; 
m m - =
1 C C U I , where  C is 
consumption of the numeraires and  I C  is consumption of the aggregated industrial 
goods. The parameter,  m , indicates a share of expenditure on industrial goods
3. The  I C  
is defined by 
 
(1)                             
1
1





















dh h c C , 
 
                                                  
3 In Krugman (1991), this is one of the key parameters that determine whether countries converge or 
diverge. However, I am going to fix this parameter in this paper to see the effect of trade costs on firm’s 
choice of location. 
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where  j n  is the large number of potential products in a country j, and s is the elasticity 
of substitution between varieties ( 1 > s ) which is assumed to be the same in all 
countries.  The higher the substitutability, the closer substitutes the varieties
4.  
 
2.2 Equilibrium Conditions 
 
     In this section, I derive (1) a demand within a country for varieties of all countries, (2) 
profit maximizing condition, (3) zero profit condition and (4) factor market clearing 
condition, all of which are the element of equilibrium analysis. 
     First, let  ) ( , h c i j  be the consumption in country i of a representative country j product. 
The prices in a country i are  i j i j h p , , ) ( t  if  i j „  and  ) ( , h p i j  if  i j = . Then the demand for 
a representative product is in general; 
 





i j i j m
q
h p h x m
t s s - - = , 
 
where  i m  is an income of country i equal to  i iL w M + - / ) 1 ( m  and  i q  is a price index of 
the industrial aggregates. However this price index is considered as a constant value. 
Since the number of varieties produced is large as in a Chamberlinian model, the effect of 
                                                  
4 In Krugman (1991), this is also one of the key parameters that determine whether countries converge or 
diverge. Although s is a parameter of tastes, it was used as an inverse index of economies of scale in 
equilibrium. However, I am going to fix this parameter in this paper to see the effect of trade costs on 
firm’s choice of location. 
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the price of any one variety on the demand for any other will be negligible. So each firm 
can ignore the effect of its actions on other firms’ behavior.  
     Second, when firms sell in each country, they perceive a constant own price demand 
elasticity of s in every market. All firms producing in any particular location have the 
same profit maximizing FOB price, which is a constant relative mark-up over marginal 
cost. 
 




sb                                                                   
 
This implies that 
j i j i w w p p / / =  for i„j.    
     Third, when firms enter and exit in response to (+) and (-) profits, at equilibrium in 
industrial sector profits will be exhausted in every country. That is, 
 
(4)                   
b
s a ) 1 ( -
= x  
 
     Lastly, following is a labor market clearing condition for a country  M i ˛ . 
 
(5)                    as i
n h




) (                                                    
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The number of manufactured good produced in each country is proportional to the 
number of workers. This also implies that  j i j i L L n n / / =  for i„j. 
 
2.3 Short Run Equilibrium and Long Run Equilibrium 
 
     Short run equilibrium will be defined in a Marshallian way, as an equilibrium in which 
the allocation of workers between countries may be taken as given. However in the long 
run, workers start to recognize their relative real wage to the other countries. So workers 
may move towards the economy that offers them higher real wages, leading to either 
convergence between countries as they move toward equality of worker/peasants ratio or 
divergence as the workers all congregate in one country.  
     In the short run, the total income of country i workers is equal to the total spending on 
these products in all countries. Therefore,  
 




















i j i i













m 1             
          
     This system of equations determines nominal wages,  i w  in the short run in which the 
allocation of workers stays the same. Note that if M=2, then the model turns out Krugman 
(1991)’s 2-region case. For the purpose of comparison, see Appendix for these conditions  
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when  M=3. I will use these conditions in the next section to highlight the effect of the 
formation of RTA on production patterns. 
     However in the long run, workers may move based on the relative size of the real 
wage. To see the real wage in each country, I need to figure out the price index for 
manufactured goods for consumers residing in that country. Following are the real wage 
and the price indices when  m / i i L f =  is the share of the manufacturing labor force in 
country i.  
 
(7)           
m v
- = i i i q w  















) ( ) ( ) ( ) (
1
i k k k i j j j i i i w f w f w f q . 
 
     When  j i v v / >1 (<1), the workers move the country  i (country  j) in the long run. 
Such relative size of real wage among countries allows us to see the pattern of economic 
geography when some of the parameters change. In particular, I am interested in the 
effect of the formation of regional trade agreements on economic geography. 
 
3 Regional Trade Agreement and Location of Firms 
 
     In this section, I try to show that equal distribution of manufacturing industries among 
the three countries become unstable after the two of the countries form a regional trade 
agreement by reducing their internal trade costs. When two countries form an RTA, the  
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firms in the rest of the world have an incentive to move into the RTA because the 
workers will move in the larger market where they find a higher real wage in the long 
run, which will be a reason for the firm to find it profitable to enter an RTA. The increase 
in the real wage of the RTA is a result of the following forces.  
     The first force comes from an expenditure effect. The existing workers in the RTA can 
spend more due to the reduction of internal trade costs. As it becomes more profitable for 
the existing firm to produce more varieties, the firms require additional workers. All 
other things being equal, this increased demand for labor will increase the nominal wage 
in the short run. In the long run, the higher wages in the RTA, the lower wages in the rest 
of the world, and the reduction of internal trade costs all work to increase the relative real 
wage of the RTA to that of the rest of the world. Therefore production will shift into the 
RTA area once it is formed. 
     As such a movement of productions and workers continues it is expected that the labor 
competition within the RTA will increase. Since the RTA makes its market larger than 
the rest of the world, the workers of the RTA will face high competition, which induces a 
decrease in nominal wage. The labor competition effect works to stop the production 
shifting-in effect eventually at some point of time.  
     Next two subsections will show how I got these results using numerical experiments 
with the equilibrium conditions (6) and (7) when M=3. 
      
3.1 Before the Formation of RTA 
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     Suppose that all countries are symmetric with  3 2 1 L L L = = .  I assume that before the 
formation of the RTA between country 1 and 2, internal trade costs ( t t t ” = 1 , 2 2 , 1 ) and 
external trade costs ( t ” = = = 2 , 3 3 , 2 1 , 3 3 , 1 t t t t ) are the same. Then from the short run 
equilibrium condition in (6), I can easily verify that nominal wages in all countries will 
be the same,  3 2 1 w w w = = . Furthermore, it is not difficult to see that the relative real 
wages are also all identical for all countries,  3 2 1 v v v = = , from the long run real wage 
equations in (7). So the workers can’t find out any incentive to move their countries 
toward any other countries.  
 
3.2 After the Formation of RTA 
 
     Now, given this symmetric specification, what if the country 1 and 2 formed an RTA? 
Note both,  3 2 1 L L L = =  and the formation of the RTA between country 1 and 2, imply 
that  3 2 1 ) ( L L L > + . To analyze its consequences for both integrating countries and the 
rest of the world, let’s remove only the internal trade cost, and keep the external trade 
cost unchanged, that is,  t
RTA < = t 1 .  
     Since I start out with the symmetric world, the nominal wages within the RTA must 
be equalized even after the formation of the RTA,  2 1 w w = . However, the formation of 
the RTA creates a nominal wage gap between the RTA members and non-RTA members 
for the following reason.   
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     First, since the internal trade costs are removed, the workers’ expenditure will increase 
relatively. So, it is more profitable for firms to produce within the RTA. It, in turn, 
creates more demand for workers in RTA regions. This will increase nominal wages 
within the RTA countries higher than ones in the rest of the world. In a symmetric world 
with parameter specifications such as  3 2 1 f f f = = =1/3,  t
RTA < = t 1 ,  3 = s  and 
3 / 1 = m , using the equation (6), one can easily calculate the nominal wage gaps between 
RTA and non-RTA area,  3 2 1 w w w > = . 
     Second, however, in the long run, workers start to perceive the real wage differences 
between countries with an RTA and the rest of the world. A worker’s real wage in 
equation (7) is affected by the nominal wages not only of his own country but also of the 
other countries through the price index. When the internal trade costs drop within the 
RTA, the nominal wage of the members increases. This has a direct positive effect on real 
wages of RTA members. Moreover, the price index is positively affected by the reduction 
of internal trade costs, the higher wages in members, and the lower wages in non-member 
all together. A simple calculation for (7) also shows that the real wage effect of an RTA 
member is positive, so the formation of the RTA would create an incentive for workers to 
move into the RTA from the rest of world.  
     Lastly, since the sum of workers from the RTA member countries becomes larger and 
larger as the process of movements of productions and workers proceeds, there will be an 
increase in labor competition within RTA. This plays a role in reducing the nominal wage 
in the short run, which will stop such movements at some point of time. See Figure 3(a) 
and (b) and the proposition 1 summarizes this result.  
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Proposition 1  Suppose that there are three countries in the world and the size of all 
countries are equal (for example,  3 2 1 f f f = = =1/3). Furthermore, suppose that initially 
the trade costs are high before the formation of the RTA ( t = t =6) and other parameters 
are  3 = s  and  3 / 1 = m . 
(a) Before the formation of an RTA between country 1 and 2, all workers and firms 
would not move from their countries. (Evenly distributed long run equilibrium) 
(b) After the formation of an RTA between country 1 and 2, the production will shift into 
the RTA from the rest of the world. (Divergence or Production shifting-in effect) 
 
     The proposition 1 for a symmetric case replicates a qualitatively same result as in 
Baldwin and Venables (1995) and Puga and Venables (1997). This result is robust in that, 
once countries form a regional trade agreements, the production shifting-in effect is 
always expected. However, in the next section, I will show that the industrial structure 
resulting from the production shifting-in effect could be unstable for a later increase in 
the level of external trade costs.       
 
4 A Firm’s Incentive to Defect from Local Manufacturing Concentrations 
 
     In this section I start out with the Puga and Venables (1997)’s situation in which all 
manufacturing firms are concentrated in one member of the RTA. The purpose of this 
section is to find out instability of industrial structure resulting from the production  
  14
shifting-in effect to a later increase in external trade costs, by examining a firm’s 
incentive to move out to the rest of the world when the external trade costs becomes 
higher. 
 
     Suppose that there are three countries, 1, 2 and 3 in the world and the trade costs are 
defined as  t t t ” = 1 , 2 2 , 1  and  t ” = = = 2 , 3 3 , 2 1 , 3 3 , 1 t t t t .  
     Now consider a situation in which all workers and manufacturing firms are 
concentrated in country 1. Country 1, then, will be the largest market in the world. Since 
a share of total income,  m, is spent on manufactures and all this income goes to country 
1, I have the following income ratio between countries. 
 















m                                                   
 
Then each firm in country 1 will have a value of sales equal to the following expression 
 
(9)                    ) )( ( 3 2 1 1 m m m
n
V + + =
m
                                         
 
where n is the total number of manufacturing firms concentrated in country 1. 
     Now let’s think about an incentive for a firm to defect this situation. A firm may 
defect to relocate in either country 2 or country 3. If it does not defect, then concentration 
of production in country 1 is in equilibrium. If it does defect, the concentration is not in  
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equilibrium. In fact, the point that I want to see here is that under what condition the 
formation of RTA makes this equilibrium unstable and how it makes the firm defect.  
 
4.1 An Incentive to Move from Country 1 to Country 2 
 
     In order for a defecting firm to relocate the productions in country 2, the firm must be 
able to attract workers. To do so, it must compensate them for the fact that all 
manufactures must be imported. So the relative nominal wages between 1 and 2 must be 
 





w .                                                                  
      
     Given this higher wage, the firm will charge a profit-maximizing price that is higher 
than that of other firms in the same proportion. Now I can drive the value of the firms’ 
sales using this fact. 
     In country 1, the defecting firm’s value of sales will be the value of sales of a 
representative firm times 
s t
- 1
1 2 ) / ( w w . In country 2, its value of sales will be that of a 
representative firm times 
s t
- 1
1 2 ) / ( w w . So total value of the defecting firm’s sales will 
be: 
 


























t m                 
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     Note that trade costs work to the defecting firm’s disadvantage in its sales to 
consumers in country 1, but work to its advantage in sales to people in country 2. Note 
also that when the cost is zero, the sales in country 1 and 2 are the same. As the cost 
increases, the sales of the defecting firm will change negatively due to the first term in 
(11) and positively due to the second term in (11). 
     From all these equations in (9), (10) and (11), I can derive the ratio of the value of 
sales by this defecting firm to the sales of firms in country 1: 
 
(12)                    [ ]
3
) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) 2 1 (
1 1 ) 1 (
1
2 m t m t m t
s s s m - + - + + =
- - -
V
V               
 
However, because fixed costs are higher in country 2 due to the higher wage rate, the 
defecting firm must have 
m t = > 1 2 1 2 / / w w V V . Now let me define a new variable 
) / ) ( ( 1 2 1 , 2
m t t V V v =  as follows. 
 
(13)                    [ ]
3
) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) 2 1 (
1 1
1 , 2
m t t m t m t
m s s ms - + - + + =
- - - -
v                              
 
     When   1 , 2 v >1, the relative value of sales by the defecting firms for the value of sales 
in country 1 is greater than the fixed cost for the firm to attract the workers from country 
1 to country 2, that is,  1 2 1 2 / / w w V V > . Therefore, it is profitable for a firm to move and  
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begin production in country 2 if all other manufacturing production is concentrated in 
country 1; when  1 , 2 v <1, it is not profitable.  
     The Figure 4 is a graphic representation of the relations of the incentives for 
deviations ( 1 , 2 v ) and trade costs when  3 = s  and  3 . 0 = m . This shows that when the trade 
costs between countries are in a very small range, the  1 , 2 v  will be less than or equal to 1. 
As the cost increases beyond some critical level, the firm’s relative value of sales will be 
higher than 1 when it defects to country 2.  
 
4.2 Incentive to Move from Country 1 to Country 3 
 
     Likewise, if the defecting country decides to produce in country 3,  ) / ) ( ( 1 3 1 , 3
m t V t V v =  
will be a function of external trade cost t, instead of t. Just replace t with t! 
 
(14)                     [ ]
3




m s s ms - + - + +
=
- - - - t t t t
v  
 
    Again, with the same reason, when  1 , 3 v >1, it is profitable for a firm to move and begin 
production in country 3 if all other manufacturing production is concentrated in country 
1; when  1 , 3 v <1, it is not profitable. The same Figure 4 will be used for the analysis. 
     Next, I am going to find a stable asymmetric equilibrium where all manufacturing 
firms are concentrated in country 1 with a zero internal trade barrier and a positive  
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external trade barrier. Then I will show that when the external trade costs are too high, 
the firm will defect to move out to country 3.  
 
4.3 Instability of the Industrial Structure Resulting from the Production Shifting-In 
Effect to a Later Increase in the External Trade Costs 
 
     Now suppose that country 1 and country 2 form an RTA and accordingly remove their 
internal trade costs, t=1. Given the regional free trade agreement, the local manufacturing 
concentration in country 1 can be a stable asymmetric equilibrium when the external 
trade cost is positive. To see this situation, in Figure 4, find a crossing point between the 
line of  1 , 3 v  with t>1 and the horizontal line at 1. Let’s call the related external trade cost 
as 
* t . When  t=1 and  t=
* t ,  1 , 2 v =1= 1 , 3 v . Therefore there is no incentive to a firm in 
country 1 to defect this equilibrium. In fact, this is the similar case as what Puga and 
Venables (1997) showed in their model.  
     Now I claim that this asymmetric equilibrium will become unstable when the external 
trade costs are high enough. I am going to increase its common external trade cost t from 
* t , and see what will happen to 
1 , 3 v . Refer to Figure 4 again and consider 
1 , 2 v  and 
1 , 3 v  as 
a function of trade costs t  and t, respectively.  
     First, since t =1 between country 1 and 2,  1 , 2 v =1 in  (13).  This means that there is no 
incentive for a firm in country 1 to move out to country 2. This is the point 1 on the 
vertical axis in the Figure 4. Second, consider  1 , 3 v , the incentive for a firm in country 1 to  
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move out to country 3. When t is 
* t , the Figure 4 shows that  1 , 3 v =1 also. However, if t 
increases above 
* t ,  1 , 3 v  will be greater than 1. This implies that a firm facing a higher 
trade costs between the RTA and its non-RTA country will have an incentive to move to 
the non-RTA area. Proposition 2 summarizes these results. 
 
Proposition 2 Suppose that there are three countries, (country1, 2 and 3) in the world and 
all workers and manufacturing firms are concentrated in country 1.  
(a) This can be a stable asymmetric equilibrium where the internal trade costs between 
countries 1 and 2 are removed and the external trade costs are still positive. That is, when 
t=1 and t=
* t >1, then  1 , 2 v =1= 1 , 3 v  in Figure 4.  
(b) This can be unstable when the external trade costs are higher than 
* t , the firms begin 
to move to the non-RTA country. That is, when  t=1 and t>
* t >1, then  1 , 2 v =1< 1 , 3 v  in 
Figure 4. 
 
     The intuition for this result is as follows. Due to the manufacturing concentration in 
country 1, all workers reside in country 1. When a firm tries to move to country 3, it has 
to attract a worker to move to country 3 as well. To do so, it has to compensate for the 
high fixed costs due to the high trade costs. With a higher wage in country 3, the worker 
will spend more money in country 3. Moreover, given the higher wage, the defecting firm 
will set a higher profit-maximizing price in country 3. Since the peasant in country 3 also 
has to pay the higher price to buy the variety produced by the defecting firm, the  
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defecting firm’s revenue will be higher in country 3 than in country 1. As a result, it 
would be more profitable for the firm to move out to the rest of the world. 
 
5 Concluding Remark 
 
     The production shifting-in effect of an RTA has been argued by several economic 
geography theorists such as Baldwin and Venables (1995) and Puga and Venables 
(1997). However the empirical evidences seemed ambiguous.   
     In this paper, I re-examined an industrial structure resulting from the production 
shifting-in effect of an RTA. In particular I focused on a later increase in the external 
trade costs. To examine this issue, I extended the Krugman’s (1991) economic geography 
model in a way that workers are hired by manufacturing firms across multiple nations. 
     First, I replicated the production shifting-in effect of an RTA in this extended 
Krugman’s model. That is, I showed that a regional integration, which drops its internal 
trade costs below given external trade costs, always pulls industry to its region and 
benefits the members. The outside manufacturing firms find it profitable to move in and 
serve the inside market of the regional integration since it gives the inside market cost 
advantages.  
     Next, to check a sensitivity of the industrial outcome resulting from the production 
shifting-in effect, I considered a stable asymmetric equilibrium where workers and 
manufacturing firms are concentrated in one member country of the RTA with zero 
internal trade costs and positive external trade costs, and saw what would happen if the  
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external trade costs become higher. I showed that when the exogenous external trade 
costs become higher against its non-RTA member, the inside manufacturing firms of the 
integrated region begin finding it profitable to move out and serve the outside market. 
This is because the costs to attract manufacturing workers are less than the revenues from 
both workers and peasants due to the higher profit-maximizing price.  
     This result shows that the industrial structure resulting from the production shifting-in 
effect of an RTA, to be stable, may need non-higher external trade costs in an economic 
geography model with a mobility of workers, which has not been able to be shown in the 















Appendix: Short run equilibrium equations when M=3.      
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Figure 4  An Incentive for a Firm to Move out to Country 3 
 
 
 
 